On LTE-WiFi Coexistence and Inter-Operator Spectrum Sharing in Unlicensed Bands: Altruism, Cooperation and Fairness by Hasan, Cengis et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On LTE-WiFi Coexistence and Inter-Operator Spectrum Sharing
in Unlicensed Bands: Altruism, Cooperation and Fairness
Citation for published version:
Hasan, C, Marina, MK & Challita, U 2016, On LTE-WiFi Coexistence and Inter-Operator Spectrum Sharing
in Unlicensed Bands: Altruism, Cooperation and Fairness. in MobiHoc '16 Proceedings of the 17th ACM
International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing. ACM, Paderborn, Germany, pp.
111-120, 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, Paderborn,
Germany, 5/07/16. DOI: 10.1145/2942358.2942382
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1145/2942358.2942382
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
MobiHoc '16 Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and
Computing
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
On LTE-WiFi Coexistence and Inter-Operator Spectrum
Sharing in Unlicensed Bands: Altruism, Cooperation and
Fairness
Cengis Hasan
chasan@inf.ed.ac.uk
Mahesh K. Marina
mahesh@ed.ac.uk
Ursula Challita
ursula.challita@ed.ac.uk
School of Informatics
The University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT
The coexistence of LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U) and WiFi in unli-
censed spectrum is studied in the context of airtime sharing. We
consider core problem where a set of LTE-U cells from differ-
ent operators share the same channel as a co-located WiFi access
point (AP). We assume that LTE-U cells utilize Listen-Before-Talk
(LBT) as the default channel access mechanism. Principally, we
deal with the following question: how should an operator’s LTE-U
cell adjust its contention window in order to provide a fair coex-
istence both with WiFi and co-located LTE-U cells of other op-
erators? We consider that LTE-U cells behave altruistically both
among themselves and to WiFi. Cooperation of LTE-U cells is
studied using a coalition formation game framework which is based
on the well-known Shapley value. We define a payoff configuration
scheme in the coalition game which involves altruism. We prove
that the coalitional game is always zero-monotonic, and Shapley
value is also max-min fair. We compare airtime sharing perfor-
mance of Shapley value with weighted proportional fairness via
numerical results and show that Shapley value provides much bet-
ter fairness than proportional fairness as determined by entropy and
Jain’s index metrics while having roughly equal average airtime.
CCS Concepts
•Theory of computation→ Network games;
Keywords
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To cope with the exponential increase in the data traffic, the op-
eration of LTE is expected to extend into unlicensed bands, an ap-
proach known as LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U). LTE-U is suitable for
LTE small cells due to the regulatory requirements that limit the
maximum transmit power in unlicensed bands. Therefore, LTE-
U will not only improve the spectrum efficiency of the unlicensed
band, but also enhance the network capacity as LTE small cells
will be able to offload data plane traffic from licensed to unlicensed
bands.
When operating on the same channel as WiFi, LTE-U imposes
new challenges such as LTE-WiFi interference and inter-operator
interference [1]. The problem of LTE-WiFi coexistence has been
evaluated in [2, 3] where it has been shown in [2] that the WiFi
terminal throughput could drop by 70% and even 100%, depend-
ing on the scenario, if LTE-WiFi interference is not mitigated. The
authors in [3] show that the impact of LTE-U on the performance
of WiFi depends on the channel bandwidth, center frequency and
MIMO configuration and can be heavily degraded for some sce-
narios. This degradation in the performance of WiFi is due to
the difference in the MAC layers of both technologies. LTE is a
scheduling based technology and is designed for the exclusive use
of the channel. On the other hand, WiFi is a contention based tech-
nology which adopts a carrier sense multiple access with collision
avoidance (CSMA/CA) mechanism where it would listen first to
the channel before transmitting and hence would risk experiencing
starvation in presence of LTE if no additional measures are taken.
In this direction, Listen-Before-Talk (LBT) has emerged as the co-
existence mechanism that would be default in newer 3GPP stan-
dards; with the LBT mechanism, which we also assume in our
work, LTE-U cells sense the occupancy of unlicensed spectrum
prior to accessing it.
As a “newcomer”, an LTE-U cell will potentially be “harmful”
to a WiFi cell. Moreover, in common scenarios where multiple dif-
ferent physical rates are used (to suit different channel conditions),
airtime fairness is considered to be a better notion of fairness than
throughput fairness even in a homogeneous WiFi network setting.
We consider the notion of fair airtime sharing in LTE-U and WiFi
coexistence scenario. with particular emphasis on the problem of
inter-operator interference that arises because multiple LTE opera-
tors may operate co-located LTE small cells using the unlicensed
spectrum. Unlike licensed frequency bands, unlicensed bands are
free to use by anyone as long as the regulatory requirements (e.g.,
maximum transmit power) are met. In [4], the authors show that
there is an upper limit on the number of operators that would want
to operate in the unlicensed bands and propose a repeated game for
multi-operators to share the unlicensed frequency bands. In fact,
inter-operator interference results from the selfish behavior of the
operators and could result in a degradation in the spectral efficiency
if not managed. Therefore, we consider coordination among differ-
ent LTE-U operators in order to share the unlicensed band in an
altruistic way, as compared to a selfish one.
Altruism, preferring others to oneself when doing a good deed,
is, according to the moralists, giving precedence to the common
interests of the community over one’s own interests; according to
this mindset, it is devoting oneself to the lives of others in complete
forgetfulness of all concerns of one’s own, it is self-annihilation in
the interests of others. Digitizing such a moral behavior is of course
challenging. However, we shall try to overcome it by assigning a
real value determining the level of altruism of a particular player
to some other player which is a common approach in an altruistic
game. Experimental and behavioral economics demonstrate that
people altruistically sacrifice their own profit to punish unfair de-
cisions by others [5]. Moreover, altruistic behavior is seen to be a
long-term net utility optimization [6–8].
Cooperation is usually imagined as a behavior by which the
agents are potentially better off. In a setting where strategic de-
cision making exists, the cooperation is studied in the framework
of coalitional games. If a coalitional game is a transferable util-
ity (TU) game, it is supposed that the utility is freely transferable
from one player to another. This is, in particular, possible in the
presence of “ideal money”, i.e. commodity whose utility is directly
proportional to quantity, and independent of any other assets, which
a player may have. In general, unfortunately, the situation is not so
simple – players’ utility for money may be not linear, it may de-
pend on other assets of players, or, in some cases, side payments
may even be forbidden. In such situations, it is better to represent
each coalition’s possibilities not by a single number, but rather by a
set of all payoff vectors, which the coalition can obtain for its mem-
bers. We then speak about coalition games with non-transferable
utility (NTU games, for short).
Shapley value [9] is widely considered as a powerful solution
concept which involves “fairness” when distributing the utility among
the members of grand coalition (grand coalition corresponds to the
case in which every player is willing to join the game). In an NTU
game, finding Shapley value might be challenging or even the game
may not posses one. So, the following question arises: if it is al-
lowed, how to design a payoff configuration in order to guarantee
the existence of Shapley value. In [10], a protocol for forming
coalitions is proposed. It is studied in the context of NTU games
and is proven that weighted utility transfers are feasible when ev-
erybody cooperates, then the expected sub-game perfect equilib-
rium payoff allocation anticipated before any implemented game is
the Shapley value. We utilize this protocol in our analysis and de-
sign the payoff configuration such that Shapley value always exists.
In a nutshell, in this paper, we aim at achieving airtime fairness
between LTE-U and WiFi AP and airtime fairness among different
LTE-U cells through cooperation and altruism. This is achieved by
adjusting the contention window of an LTE-U cell according to the
Shapley value. We put forward a scheme for sharing the airtime us-
ing a dynamic model where LTE-U cells calculate their contention
window cooperatively by taking into account each others’ channel
characteristics. In a slotted basis, each cell updates its own “al-
truistic weight” and calculates its contention window taking into
account the altruistic weights of the other cells. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to apply altruistic modelling and
Shapley value for a network resource allocation problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
First, we consider the multi-cell case and show how the airtime
fraction of a particular LTE-U cell can be found. We then introduce
a framework about the altruistic gain of the WiFi AP which is based
on the traffic loads of LTE-U cells and the traffic per user of the
WiFi AP.
Second, we model the interaction among LTE-U cells as a coali-
tional game which is based on so called non-transferable utility
(NTU). The motivation is to cooperate in order to access the shared
channel in a fair way. Fairness is sought to be attained thanks to the
altruism in NTU Shapley value. The payoff of a particular player
is chosen to be the airtime fraction. Each player calculates sepa-
rately a weighted combination of logarithms of airtime fractions of
all players, in a similar way like in proportional fairness scheme.
We call the weights as altruistic weights which we choose to be the
reciprocal of normalized raw throughput1. Then, we show how it
corresponds to Shapley value that possesses several properties sat-
isfying some degree of axiomatic fairness [9]. Thus, we attempt to
involve altruism in Shapley value in order to increase fairness. We
prove that considered coalitional game is always zero-monotonic
which is a property for ensuring that the Shapley value always ex-
ists and also for having all players cooperate and be part of a grand
coalition. Besides, we prove that the Shapley value provides max-
min fairness.
Third, we compare Shapley value and weighted proportional fair-
ness in which the weights are set by an altruistic scheme. We mea-
sure the fairness quantitatively using the measures of airtime frac-
tion, Jain’s index and entropy [11]. In numerical results, we demon-
strate that Shapley value provides better fairness than proportional
fairness while resulting in similar airtime.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an environment where WiFi APs are already de-
ployed and pre-assigned channels in which they serve their WiFi
stations. LTE-U cells come to the medium which can be interpreted
as “newcomers”. Even though there is a flexibility in determining
the channel access mechanism in unlicensed bands, there are reg-
ulatory restrictions in some regions of the world which are driving
the use of Listen-Before-Talk (LBT) as the default channel access
mechanism in newer 3GPP standards for LTE operation in unli-
censed bands. As per ETSI, the LBT channel access mechanism
can be designed both as Frame Based Equipment (FBE) where
the transmit/receive structure is not directly demand-driven but has
fixed timing; and Load Based Equipment (LBE) where the trans-
mit/receive structure is not fixed in time but demand-driven. We as-
sume that load based LBT is implemented in an LTE-U cell. LBE-
LBT (henceforth referred to as LBT, unless explicitly stated other-
wise) simply works as follows [12]: an initial clear channel assess-
ment (CCA) of at least 20 µs is performed prior to a new transmis-
sion. If the equipment finds the channel to be clear, it may transmit
immediately. In case the medium is sensed to be already occupied,
the transmission is deferred and an extended CCA (ECCA) is per-
formed until the channel is found to be idle. In an ECCA check,
1Throughput of an LTE-U cell can be given by R = αr where 0 ≤
α ≤ 1 is airtime fraction, and r is called as raw throughput.
the operating channel is observed for the duration of a random fac-
tor NCIS multiplied by the CCA observation time. NCIS defines the
number of clear idle slots that need to be observed before initia-
tion of the transmission. The value of NCIS is randomly selected as
NCIS ∈ [1,Q] every time an extended CCA is required and the value
stored in a counter. The value of Q is selected by the manufacturer
in the range of [4,32]. The counter is decremented every time a
CCA slot is deemed to be unoccupied. When the counter reaches
zero, the equipment may transmit.
With the above background, our problem in this work is
how to adjust the contention window adaptively in or-
der to provide a fair coexistence of LTE-U cells with a
co-located WiFi cell.
Moreover, we consider a multi LTE-U operator case as illustrated
in Figure 1. Briefly, we assume that
1. LBT is default in LTE-U cells;
2. an LTE-U cell can adapt its contention window in order to pro-
vide a fair channel access with a WiFi AP;
3. LTE-U cells of different operators can cooperate which means
that inter-operator cooperation is possible;
4. WiFi APs are assumed to coordinate implicitly through distributed
coordination function (DCF).
We suppose that LTE-U cells and a particular WiFi AP operates on
the same amount of bandwidth in shared single unlicensed spec-
trum channel. The throughput of a particular cell is thus determined
by only the airtime which is the total amount of time during which
the cell accesses the channel.
Figure 1: System model.
2.1 LTE-U Transmission Mode and WiFi
LTE-U can operate both frequency division (FDD) and time di-
vision (TDD) multiplexing modes. In unlicensed spectrum, supple-
mental downlink and TDD access is preferred. As default, LTE-U
is based on OFDMA which gives LTE additional diversity in the
time and frequency domain that Wi-Fi lacks, since Wi-Fi band-
width is assigned to a single user at any time. However, in this
work, we assume that an LTE-U cell transmits in unlicensed spec-
trum using supplemental downlink in FDD mode to one or more
UEs using all or a subset of subcarriers in the corresponding unli-
censed spectrum channel.
2.2 Inter-Operator Cooperation
The operators cooperate in order to increase their airtime in the
shared channel as well as aim to “behave” fairly to the WiFi AP.
The LTE-U cells’ network constitute a bidirectional graph which
represents the signalling arising due to the formation of coalitions
of these cells. The coalitions of LTE-U cells are determined in
a slotted basis. At the beginning of every slot, the LTE-U cells
determine contention windows cooperatively, then transmission is
performed until the end of the slot.
The cost of cooperation among LTE-U cells is due to the infor-
mation exchanged among them with respect to raw throughputs and
number of UEs in each cell. Obviously, the cost of cooperation in-
creases when the number of players within a coalition increases.
However, the frequency of adaptation of contention window is cru-
cial. In this work, we assume that the impact of cooperation cost is
limited since the frequency of reforming coalition is not high.
3. FORMAL PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The study below considers a set of LTE-U cells denoted by N =
{1, . . ., |N |}, and a WiFi cell denoted by w operating on the same
unlicensed spectrum channel. We denote by ni the number of UEs
that are served by LTE-U cell i.
The interference channel model, known also as the many-to-
many channel is assumed. It consists of point-to-point links which
are close enough to produce mutual interference because of shar-
ing the same channel. We consider a block slow fading channel
model such that channel realizations remain constant during a pe-
riod. The channels statistically experience some fading distribution
and we represent by Gi j the channel gain between i and j. The
transmit power of cell i is denoted by Pi and the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) between LTE-U cell i and UE j that it serves can be
given by PiGi j/N0 where N0 is the power spectral density of ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise. The throughput of the link between
LTE-U cell i and its UE is a function of SNR and can be given by
Ri j = αiB log(1+γiPiGi j/BN0) = αiri j (1)
where αi is the fraction of airtime used by cell i ∈N during the cor-
responding slot, B is the channel bandwidth, and γi is a coefficient
related to the modulation scheme. We call ri j as raw throughput.
We denote by nw the number of WiFi stations in the WiFi cell.
We denote by CWi and CWw the contention window of LTE-U cell
i, and contention window of WiFi cell, both operating on the same
unlicensed channel, respectively. The contention window of the
WiFi cell has an exponential backoff scheme with a maximum of
cw
S
retries.
3.1 Contention Window of an LTE-U Cell and
Airtime
In this work, we consider that the contention window of an LTE-
U cell does not follow any exponential backoff scheme but rather,
we calculate its size in order to provide a fair channel access with
the WiFi AP. The LTE-U cells update their contention window in
every slot.
Let us now calculate the contention window of an LTE-U Cell.
We define the following probabilities:
• qw : collision probability of a WiFi station
• qLi : collision probability of LTE-U cell i
• pw : stationary probability of a WiFi station
• pLi : stationary probability of LTE-U cell i
Since the contention window of an LTE-U cell is constant during a
slot, we have the following:
pLi =
2
CWi +1
, ∀i ∈ N , (2)
pw =
2(1−2qw )
(1−2qw )(CWw +1)+ qwCWw (1− (2qw )cwS )
(3)
These are based on the well-known Bianchi model [13]. The
collision probabilities can be calculated as following:
qLi = 1− (1− pw )nw
∏
j∈N\i (1− p
L
j ), ∀i ∈ N (4)
and
qw = 1− (1− pw )nw−1
∏
j∈N (1− p
L
j ). (5)
The airtime fraction of LTE-U cell i can be calculated as following:
αi = pLi
∏
j∈N\i (1− p
L
j )(1− pw ), ∀i ∈ N . (6)
On the other hand, the airtime fraction of the WiFi cell can be given
by
αw = 1−
∑
i∈N
αi . (7)
In the following, we aim at finding stationary probabilities of LTE-
U cells such that the airtime fraction is optimized under some con-
straints, and then, adjust contention window accordingly.
3.2 Minimal Airtime Fraction of WiFi Cell
We represent by fw ∈ [0,1] minimal airtime fraction that the
WiFi cell w operates on the channel. Note that this is the airtime
fraction of the WiFi cell which comprises the total usage fraction
scattered throughout a slot. Statistically, it can be understood as
the probability of channel usage per slot. On the other hand, total
maximal airtime fraction of all LTE-U cells is given by 1− fw .
The value of fw is determined by the LTE-U cells. Each LTE-U
cell assigns a value which we call as altruistic gain and denote by
gi ∈ [0,1]. The latter means that LTE-U cell i renounce the airtime
fraction by gi to WiFi AP. Formally, fw is given by
fw =
∑
i∈N
gi ≤ 1, such that gi ≤ 1|N | , ∀i ∈ N . (8)
We set upper-bound 1/|N | for gi such that when every LTE-U cell
is fully altruistic, then fw =
∑
i∈N 1/|N | = 1 corresponds to the
extreme case where every LTE-U does not operate on the channel.
Moreover, we assume that the altruistic gains are calculated using
a data-based model taking into account the number of UEs in each
LTE-U cell and number of stations in the WiFi cell. Formally, gi is
calculated as follows:
gi =
(
1− κ ni
nw
)+ 1
|N | , (9)(
1− κ ni
nw
)+
= max
(
1− κ ni
nw
,0
)
, (10)
where 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 is parameter which can be interpreted as a calibrat-
ing parameter of altruistic gains and we call it as altruism modula-
tor. It plays a significant role in determining the airtime fraction of
the WiFi cell. When κ = 1, and if ni > nw,∀i ∈ N , then we come up
with the case where fw = 0. In the other extreme case when κ = 0,
then it means that all airtime will be used by the WiFi cell.
Note that if LTE-U cell i has zero UEs, then the gain that WiFi
cell achieves is 1/|N | in airtime fraction. In the extreme case where
there is no any UE that any LTE-U cell serves, then fw = 1 since
for every i, gi = 1/|N |. Based on the proposed formulation, an
LTE-U cell needs to know active WiFi devices. We assume that an
LTE-U cell can learn the number of active WiFi devices based on
their corresponding MAC addresses during the sensing period.
4. THE GAME: ALTRUISTIC COOPERA-
TION MODEL
We are modelling the interaction among the cells as a cooperative
game which is based on so called non-transferable utility (NTU).
Non-transferable utility is the concept capturing the fact that the
utility of a coalition is not dividable among the members of the
corresponding coalition, but rather it is given by its set of players
and the sets of outcomes that are feasible for each subset coalition
of players.
4.1 The NTU Game Formulation
Let N be the set of the players (i.e., LTE-U cells). Non-empty
subsets ofN are called as coalitions, i.e. S ⊆N . A non-transferable
utility game on N is a correspondence V –the coalitional function
– that assigns to each coalition S a subset V (S) ∈ <S where <S
is the set of all functions from S to <. An element α = (αi )i∈S
where α ∈ V (S) is interpreted as follows: there exists an outcome
that is feasible for the coalition S whose payoff to player i is αi ,
∀i ∈ S. Moreover, V satisfies the following properties [10]:
1. For each S ⊆ N , the set V (S) is non-empty, closed, convex,
comprehensive (i.e., if α ∈ V (S) and α′ ≤ α, then α′ ∈ V (S))
and bounded from above, (i.e., for each α ∈ <S , the set {α′ ∈
V (S) : α′ ≥ α} is compact).
2. Normalization: For each i ∈ N , the maximum of {α : α ∈ V (i)},
denoted by α˜i is nonnegative and called as individual payoff of
i.
3. Zero-monotonicity: For each S ⊆ N , α ∈ V (S) and i < S, the
utility vector is (α, α˜i ) ∈ V (S∪ i). This implies that (α˜i )i∈S ∈
<S belongs to V (S).
4. The boundary of V (N ) denoted by ∂V (N ) is non-level in the
positive orthant meaning that at any point of ∂V (N ) ∩<N ,
there exists an outward vector with positive coordinates.
5. For each S ⊂ N , if α ∈ ∂V (S) with αi < 0 for i ∈ S′ ⊂ S, then
∂V (S) at α is parallel to the subspace<S′ .
Note that property 5 is not relevant in airtime sharing problem since
all relevant action occurs in positive orthant (i.e. αi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N ).
A transferable utility game (TU game) on N is a characteristic
value function v : 2S→< which assigns a real value v(S) for each
coalition S, also v(∅) = 0. We can express a TU game as a special
NTU game:
V˜ (S) =
α ∈ RS :
∑
i∈S
αi ≤ v(S)
 . (11)
Let us denote by Π the set of all the orders of players in N . Given
pi ∈ Π and i ∈ N , we define Ppi
i
which is the set of players coming
before player i in the order pi:
Ppii = { j ∈ N : pi( j) < pi(i)}. (12)
4.2 The NTU Shapley Value
Consider a TU game on N with value function v and let pi ∈ Π.
The marginal contribution of player i under the order pi can be
given by v(Ppi
i
∪ i)− v(Ppi
i
) ∈ <. The Shapley value of a TU game
is the vector Sh(N ,v) ∈ <N of which ith coordinate is given by
Shi (N ,v) = 1|Π |
∑
pi∈Π
[
v(Ppii ∪ i)− v(Ppii )
]
.
Let λ = (λi )i∈N ∈ <N and for each i ∈ N , λi > 0. Let us define
the following:
vλ(S) := max

∑
i∈S
λiαi : α ∈ V (S)
 .
A vector α ∈ V (N ) is a NTU Shapley value of V if there exists a
vector λ such that
∀S ⊆ N ,∃α ∈ V (S) such that
∑
i∈S
λiαi = v
λ(S). (13)
λiαi = Shi (N ,vλ), ∀i ∈ N . (14)
4.3 Coalition Formation Mechanism for Find-
ing the NTU Shapley Value
The mechanism is proposed in [10] and we refer to it for detailed
reading. Let us define a rule as a function δ which assigns a vec-
tor δ(S) ∈ V (S) to each coalition S. Formally, a rule is a “payoff
configuration” which should be interpreted as an index that indi-
cates payoff allocations when a particular coalition is formed. The
mechanism M(pi) works as following:
1. An order of the players pi is randomly chosen;
2. When the turn comes to player i, it is faced with coalition S ⊂
Ppi
i
with a specific rule δ, and a set of players E =Ppi
i
\S having
chosen to stay out of coalition S;
3. Players in S, E and N \Ppi
i
are called active players, passive
players and candidates, respectively;
4. Then, player i must either agree to join the coalition (in which
case, player i becomes an active player and the turn passes to
candidate i + 1) or disagree, proposing both a new rule δ′ and
a new coalition S′ ⊂ Ppi
i
∪ i which includes himself and all the
members of the old coalition (i.e., S∪ i ⊂ S′);
5. The members of S′ \ i vote sequentially to either accept or reject
this proposal; if they all vote “yes”, the new coalition S′ forms
with the new rule (the proposal is accepted), and the turn passes
to candidate i + 1; if at least one member of S′ \ i votes “no”,
then player i becomes a passive player and the turn passes to
candidate i+1;
6. When no more candidates remain, the following coalitions are
obtained: S = N coalition of active players, E = N \S set of
passive players, and a rule δ for the coalition S;
7. The final payoff, for each player i ∈ S is δi (S) and all the play-
ers i ∈ E receives their individual payoffs α˜i ;
REMARK 1. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equi-
librium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame
of the original game. Informally, this means that if (i) the play-
ers played any smaller game that consisted of only one part of
the larger game and (ii) their behavior represents a Nash equi-
librium of that smaller game, then their behavior is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the larger game. In [10], it is proven
that mechanism M(pi) provides the following result: if V (N )
is bounded by a hyperplane, then there exists a unique ex-
pected subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) payoff in
the negotiation mechanism M, that is the NTU Shapley value.
Furthermore, the strategy of a player in SPNE in the negoti-
ation mechanism M(pi) for any pi is robust to deviations by
coalitions of his predecessors in pi.
4.4 Airtime Fraction as Payoff Configuration
We basically consider that the payoff of an LTE-U cell is exactly
the value of airtime fraction. The individual payoffs are calculated
using a weighted logarithmic scheme which can be interpreted as a
version of proportional fairness with different constraints. The in-
dividual payoffs are obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
α˜,qw,pL
∑
i∈N
ui log α˜i subject to
C˜,
0 ≤ α˜i ≤ (1− fw ) 1|N | , ∀i ∈ N , (15)
where we group the constraints related to the probabilities as fol-
lows:
C˜ ≡

pw =
2(1−2qw )
(1−2qw )(CWw+1)+qwCWw (1−(2qw )c
w
S )
α˜i = pLi
∏
j∈N\i (1− pLj )(1− pw ),∀i ∈ N
qw = 1− (1− pw )nw−1 ∏j∈N (1− pLj )
0 ≤ pLi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
0 ≤ qw ≤ 1

. (16)
Note that the individual payoff of i is limited by (1 − fw )/|N |.
1− fw corresponds to the total airtime fraction of all LTE-U cells.
1/|N | is what an LTE-U cell can claim when it is passive. ui ∈ [0,1]
is the altruistic weight of LTE-U cell i. If ui = 0, then it means that
LTE-U cell i is completely unselfish while ui = 1 corresponds to
completely selfish case. Note that individual payoffs are calculated
at the beginning of mechanism M(pi).
REMARK 2. The weighted proportional fairness can be
obtained by solving the same problem given in equation (15)
but the constraints 0 ≤ α˜i ≤ (1− fw )/|N |, ∀i ∈ N must be
changed to 0 ≤ ∑i∈N α˜i ≤ (1− fw ).
Assume that LTE-U cell k ∈ N \Ppi
k
is a candidate. Then, it cal-
culates the payoff configuration. If it proposes a better payoff con-
figuration for every cell which are active players in S in mechanism
M(pi), then the new payoffs are α(S′) = (α1(S′), . . ., α |S′ | (S′))
where S′ = S∪ k. The constraints related to probabilities of S′ are
given by
C(S′) ≡

qw = qw (S′) = 1− (1− pw )nw−1 ∏j∈N (1− pLj (S′))
pw =
2(1−2qw )
(1−2qw )(CWw+1)+qwCWw (1−(2qw )c
w
S )
α˜i = pLi (S′)
∏
j∈N\i (1− pLj (S′))(1− pw ),∀i ∈ E \ k
0 ≤ pLi (S′) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
0 ≤ qw (S′) ≤ 1

.
(17)
Thus, the payoff configuration proposed by LTE-U cell k is given
by
max
α,qw,pL
∑
i∈S′
ui logαi (S′) subject to
C(S′),
αi (S′) = pLi (S′)
∏
j∈N\i (1− p
L
j (S′))(1− pw ), ∀i ∈ S′,∑
i∈S′
αi (S′) ≤ (1− fw )
S′
|N | ,
αi (S) ≤ αi (S′) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ S,
α˜k ≤ αk (S′) ≤ 1. (18)
αi (S) ≤ αi (S′) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ S ensures that every cell in active players
set S is better off in new active player set S′. Besides cell k is
better off in S′ than its individual payoff α˜k . Note that the rule
δ(S) for any S represented in M(pi) is exactly α(S).
4.5 Altruistic Weights
The choice of altruistic weights is flexible. However, here we
shall assume that a particular player adjusts its altruistic weight ac-
cording to its normalized raw throughput which is given by
r¯i =
r ′i
mink∈N r ′k
, (19)
where for any i ∈ N , we define r ′i = minj∈{1,...,ni } ri j . Thus, the
altruistic weight of player i is chosen to be inversely proportional
to the normalized raw throughput, i.e.
ui =
1
r¯i
, ∀i ∈ N . (20)
Note that such a choice captures the fact that the LTE-U cell shall
update its altruistic weight whenever the raw throughputs are changed.
4.6 Properties of the Coalitional Game
Theoretical results about the coalitional game are stated below.
LEMMA 1. The region imposed by C˜ and 0 ≤ α˜i ≤ (1−
fw )/|N |,∀i ∈ N is bounded and feasible. The game imposes
zero-monotonicity.
LEMMA 2. V (N ) is bounded by a hyperplane, then there
exists a unique expected subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
payoff in mechanism M, that is the NTU Shapley value.
LEMMA 3. The airtime fraction configuration is max-min
fair.
PROOF. For proofs see appendix.
5. DYNAMICS OF THE PROBLEM
The considered problem possesses the following discrete-time
dynamics:
1. adaptation procedure is carried out by LTE-U cells at the begin-
ning of a slot; adaptation procedure comprises of updating the
information of raw throughputs, number of UEs in each LTE-U
cell and number of stations in the WiFi cell and calculating the
contention window;
2. transmission: LTE-U cells and the WiFi cell operate until the
end of the slot.
We can consider a time diagram where adaptation and transmis-
sion are performed serially. Basically, the frequency of adaptation
can be defined as FA = τA/(τ+ τA) where τA and τ stands for the
time needed for adaptation procedure, and the transmission time of
all LTE-U cells and WiFi cell, respectively. At the end of τ + τA,
the adaptation procedure is repeated. Note that τA increases when
the coalition increases. The time cost of exchanging the informa-
tion increases linearly, however, the time cost for calculation of
contention window is determined by the computational complex-
ity of the optimization problem given in equation (15). We choose
τ (e.g. around seconds) such that the impact of τA (e.g. around
milliseconds) becomes negligible. Note that the channel statistics
determine if we need to calculate the airtime fractions of the LTE-
U cells. So, whenever the channel coefficients are unchanged, we
can skip the adaptation procedure and continue on transmission.
In summary, we can design an algorithm which involves the adap-
tation procedure and calculation of Shapley value. Each LTE-U
cell possesses all related information, and they calculate separately
{α˜,qw, pL }. Then, they adapt their own contention window accord-
ing to these values. Note that an algorithm, as such, is completely
distributed.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we obtain numerical results by calculating the
airtime fraction of a particular LTE-U cell. We also measure the
fairness by two quantitative fairness measures: entropy and Jain’s
index. Entropy reflects fairness aspects [11] considering the pro-
portions of resources are allocated to the individuals inN . Propor-
tion of LTE-U cell i is αi/
∑
j∈N α j , and
Entropy = −
∑
i∈N
[
αi∑
j∈N α j
log2
(
αi∑
j∈N α j
)]
.
Algorithm 1 Contention Window Adaptation
Initialization:
1) at the beginning of slot, each LTE-U cell i sends ni and r ′i ;
2) nw is sensed by each LTE-U cell;
Adapting Contention Window:
3) each LTE-U cell determines its own stationary probability
4) each LTE-U cell calculates its own contention window accord-
ing to stationary probability
5) each LTE-U cell operates until the end of slot and then go to
step 1)
Jain’s index is well-known and is defined as:
Jain’s Index =
(∑
i∈N αi
)2
|N |∑i∈N α2i .
We compare NTU Shapley value and proportional fairness [14]
with respect to average airtime fraction, average entropy and Jain’s
index. We choose the comparison with proportional fairness since
it is widely accepted and used fair resource allocation scheme. In
the figures, SV and PF stands for Shapley Value and Proportional
Fairness, respectively.
In the following, actually, we seek a trade-off between fairness
and performance by comparing SV and PF. In the figures, we change
fw between 0 and 1, which should be interpreted as changing pa-
rameters on which fw depends. We assume that nw = 6 and κ = 0.5,
since fw =
∑
i∈N max(1− κni/nw,0), ni changes between 0 and 3
for all i ∈ N .
6.1 Example Scenario: Different Throughputs
of LTE-U Cells
Consider that there are |N | = 4 LTE-U cells and the following
parameters are assumed for WiFi cell: CW = 32,cw
S
= 3,nw = 6.
Let the raw throughputs be given as 4r ′1 = 3r
′
2 = 2r
′
3 = r
′
4, and so
min(r ′1,r
′
2,r
′
3,r
′
4) = r
′
1. Therefore, u1 = 1,u2 = 3/4,u3 = 1/2, and
u4 = 1/4. This example, as such, demonstrates the performance
comparison of SV and PF in a scenario where the raw throughputs
of the LTE-U cells are diverse — LTE-U cell 4 has the best raw
throughput while LTE-U 1 has the worst one. In Figures 2 and 3,
we depict the change of airtime fraction, Jain’s index and entropy,
respectively, with respect to fw . The airtime fraction in case of
SV is not always monotonic with respect to fw . Note that LTE-U
cell 2, 3, and 4 has a maximum for different values of fw . Only
LTE-U cell 1 is favored by PF. The other cells are better off in
SV. Jain’s index and entropy figures show similar behavior with
respect to fw . Note that SV is superior compared to PF in terms
of fairness measures (Jain’s index and Entropy). The calculation of
airtime fraction in SV is a procedure involving each LTE-U cells’
own objective, and that results in a better fairness.
6.2 Average Airtime Fraction, Jain’s Index and
Entropy
We do Monte Carlo simulations for finding average values of
airtime fraction, Jain’s index and entropy with respect to chang-
ing values of fw . We assume the following parameters in WiFi:
CWw = 32,cwS = 3,nw = 6. We also suppose that the normalized
raw throughputs are produced according to uniform distribution
taking values in [1,5]. In Figure 4, we plot the comparison of SV
and PF in terms of mean airtime fraction with respect to fw for
different numbers of LTE-U cells. We plot also the change of mean
airtime fraction of a WiFi station with respect to fw .
Figure 4 reveals the fact that both SV and PF have similar proper-
ties. The monotonicity is not guaranteed for changing values of fw .
The curves corresponding to |N | = 5 show that mean airtime frac-
tion is not monotonic. On the other hand, the difference between
the curves of SV and PF is not so high even though the curves re-
lated to PF are slightly better than those of SV. On the other hand,
as it can be expected, a WiFi station is better off when fw increases.
SV provides slightly better mean airtime fraction for a WiFi station.
As per mean entropy and average Jain’s index, in Figure 5, we
compare SV and PF for increasing numbers of LTE-U cells. SV
demonstrates better performance for both measures. When fw is
small, SV and PF are near each other both for mean entropy and
Jain’s index. Besides, the gap in mean Jain’s index increases when
fw is high. It means that PF is less fair when the LTE-U cells
operate less on the channel.
In Figure 6, we compare SV and PF in terms of mean airtime
fraction with respect to κ for different numbers of LTE-U cells.
We plot also the change of mean airtime fraction of a WiFi sta-
tion with respect to κ. We keep the same parameters for WiFi as
above. Moreover, we generate integers randomly according to uni-
form distribution taking values in [3,10] to obtain values of ni . It is
obvious that when κ increases mean airtime fraction of an LTE-U
cell increases and of a WiFi station decreases. However, the figure
implies the logarithmic dependence on κ which may be interpreted
that dramatic impact of κ occurs in the lower values. For example,
for |N | = 3 and κ ≈ 0.3, mean airtime fraction of an LTE-U cell
matches that of a WiFi station.
7. RELATED WORK
In order to coexist fairly with WiFi in the unlicensed band, sev-
eral approaches for LTE-U have been investigated in the litera-
ture. The suggested techniques can be divided into two different
categories according to the adopted methodology: (i) LBT based
which involves LTE carrier sensing the unlicensed channel before
any transmission and (ii) duty cycling based where LTE adopts the
almost-blank-subframes (ABS) feature in order to blank a particu-
lar proportion of the subframes. Most of the previous work assumes
a duty cycling approach for LTE-WiFi coexistence (e.g., [15–17]),
however, this approach would allow WiFi transmissions only when
LTE is silent. On the other hand, LBT allows the sharing of the un-
licensed band in an asynchronous manner, as opposed to a sched-
uled one. Moreover, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
has identified LBT as the direction for standardizing a global solu-
tion for LTE-U and hence meeting the LBT regulatory requirements
in markets such as Europe and Japan [18]. Nevertheless, there has
been a limited amount of work that considers LBT for the coexis-
tence of LTE and WiFi in the unlicensed band [19–23]. The expo-
nential backoff of CSMA/CA is adopted for LTE-U cells in [19],
however, this technique leads to a degradation in performance due
to the unnecessary retransmissions where nodes consider all failed
transmissions as collisions whereas only part of them are real col-
lisions. In [20–22] the authors suggest a LBT scheme with a ran-
dom backoff mechanism employing a fixed contention window size
where an LTE-U cell chooses a random backoff counter uniformly
from a predefined fixed contention window. This mechanism, how-
ever, does not take into account the load level and activity of LTE-U
cells and WLAN and does not adapt to the changing traffic load and
thus neglects the fairness metric between the two technologies. The
Figure 2: Example scenario: Airtime fraction with respect to fw .
Figure 3: Example scenario: Jain’s index and entropy with re-
spect to fw .
Figure 4: Comparison of SV and PF: Mean airtime fraction
with respect to fw for increasing numbers of LTE-U cells.
Figure 5: Comparison of SV and PF: Mean entropy and Jain’s
index with respect to fw for increasing numbers of LTE-U cells.
authors in [23] suggest an adaptive LBT scheme where the LTE-U
cell contention window size varies according to the available li-
censed BW and WiFi traffic load, but their system model is limited
Figure 6: Comparison of SV and PF: Mean airtime fraction
with respect to κ for increasing numbers of LTE-U cells.
to a single LTE-U cell.
In contrast to the aforementioned work, the focus of this paper
is on modelling the interaction between multiple co-located LTE-U
small cell operators. Although the negative impact of selfishness
is noted in the literature [4], there is no model that captures the
cooperation among operators, especially when LBT is used as the
channel access mechanism. Our work offers a theoretical frame-
work to fill this void.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the coexistence problem of LTE-U and WiFi
in unlicensed spectrum where LTE-U utilizes Listen-Before-Talk
(LBT) as the default channel access mechanism. We have exam-
ined how LTE-U cells from different operators must adjust their
contention windows in order to provide a fair coexistence both with
WiFi and among themselves. We studied an altruistic model where
LTE-U cells behave altruistically both among themselves and to
WiFi. Interaction of LTE-U cells is studied using a coalition forma-
tion game framework which is based on Shapley value. We showed
how our proposed payoff configuration scheme, which involves al-
truism, is always zero-monotonic, and also showed that Shapley
value is also max-min fair. Comparison of Shapley value with
weighted proportional fairness through numerical results demon-
strate that the former is more fair while providing similar average
airtime performance.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since ≤ α˜i ≤ (1− fw )(1/|N |) and α˜i = pLi
∏
j∈N\i (1− pLj )(1−
pw ),∀i ∈ N , the optimization problem given in equation (15) can
be given by
max
∑
i∈N
ui log
*.,pLi
∏
j∈N\i
(1− pLj )(1− pw )+/-
= max*.,
∑
i∈N
ui log*,
pLi
1− pL
i
+-+
∑
i∈N
ui log
(
1− qw
(1− pw )nw−2
)+/-
subject to
1− qw
(1− pw )nw−2
≤ *, 1pLi −1+- (1− f )|N | , ∀i ∈ N
pw =
2(1−2qw )
(1−2qw )(CWw +1)+ qwCWw (1− (2qw )cwS )
,
1− qw
(1− pw )nw−1
=
∏
j∈N
(1− pLj ),
0 ≤ pLi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N ,0 ≤ qw ≤ 1.
The terms (1− qw )/(1− pw )nw−1 and (1− qw )/(1− pw )nw−2 are
monotonically decreasing with respect to qw . Since
(1− qw )/(1− pw )nw−1 =
∏
j∈N
(1− pLj ) ≤ 1,
there is always a solution set with pLi ≥ pLj ,∀i, j ∈
−→N where −→N is
the ordered set according to values of pLi which is directly adjusted
by ui . Thus, we have also uLi ≥ uLj ⇔ pLi ≥ pLj ,∀i, j ∈
−→N .
Consider an order of players pi ∈ Π and LTE-U cell k which is
in turn. Before k, let the active players, passive players, and can-
didates be S, E, and N \Ppi
k
. Note that zero-monotonicity implies
that the set of passive players is an empty set, i.e. E ≡ ∅ which
accounts for the case where in every turn, the player is better off
in the new payoff configuration. This comes from the constraint
α˜i ≤ αi (S),∀i ∈ S entailing a new payoff configuration only if ev-
ery active player and the candidate are better off. The constraint
related to the airtime fraction of all LTE-U cells is given by
∑
i∈Ppi
k
∪k
αi (Ppik ∪ k) ≤ (1− f )
Ppik ∪ k 
|N |
αi (Ppik ) ≤ αi (Ppik ∪ k), ∀i ∈ Ppik ,
α˜k ≤ αk (Ppik ∪ k).
The total airtime fraction before and after k is given by
∑
i∈Ppi
k
αi (Ppik )+∑
j∈E α˜ j + α˜k and
∑
i∈Ppi
k
αi (Ppik ∪ k)+αk (Ppik ∪ k)+
∑
j∈E α˜ j , re-
spectively. The difference airtime fraction of leaving E and joining
S is always positive, i.e. ∑i∈Ppi
k
αi (Ppik ∪ k) −
∑
i∈Ppi
k
αi (Ppik ) +
αk (Ppik ∪ k) − α˜k ≥ 0 since
∑
i∈Ppi
k
αi
(
Ppi
k
∪ k
)
≥ ∑i∈Ppi
k
αi (Ppik )
and αk (Ppik ∪k) ≥ α˜k . That proves that the game is zero-monotonic.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For any order of players pi the airtime fraction given by α =
α(N ) ∈ V (N ) is always a hyperplane that can be defined as H ={
α :
∑
i∈N λiαi = vλ(N )
}
which is basically a set described by a
single scalar product equality. On the other hand, the Shapley value
of player i can also be defined in the following form:
Shi (N ,v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
|S|!(|N | − |S| −1)!
|N |!
(
vλ(S∪ i)− vλ(S)
)
For sake of simplicity, let us write separately the part of player i as
following:
Shi (N ,v) =
∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |!
(
vλ(S∪ i)− vλ(S)
)
+
∑
j∈N\i
(|N | −2)!
|N |!
(
vλ( j, i)− vλ( j)
)
+
( |N | −1)!
|N |! v
λ(i)
Recall that from (14), we have λiαi (N ) = Shi (N ,vλ). A so-
lution of this problem can be obtained by assuming that for any
S ⊆ N , αi (S) = ζ α˜i,∀i ∈ S where note that ζ ≥ 1 due to the as-
sumption that αi (S) ≥ α˜i , ∀S ⊆ N . Thus, λiζ α˜i = Shi (N ,vλ). In
that case, Shi (N ,v) becomes∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |!
*.,
∑
k∈S∪i
λkαk (S∪ i)
−
∑
k∈S
λkαk (S)+/-+
∑
j∈N\i
( |N | −2)!
|N |!
(
λiαi (i, j)+ λ jα j (i, j)− λ j α˜ j
)
+
( |N | −1)!
|N |! λi α˜i
=
∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |!
*.,
∑
k∈S
λk (ζ α˜k )+ λi (ζ α˜i )
−
∑
k∈S
λk
(
ζ α˜k
)+/-+
∑
j∈N\i
(|N | −2)!
|N |!
(
λi
(
ζ α˜i
)
+ λ j
(
ζ α˜ j
)
− λ j α˜ j
)
+
( |N | −1)!
|N |! λi α˜i
which results in
Shi (N ,v) =
∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |! λiζ α˜i
+
∑
j∈N\i
( |N | −2)!
|N |!
(
λiζ α˜i + λ j ζ α˜ j − λ j α˜ j
)
+
(|N | −1)!
|N |! λi α˜i .
Since λiζ α˜i = Shi (N ,vλ), we have to choose ζ = 1, and then
Shi (N ,v) = λi α˜i *.,
∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |!
+
∑
j∈N\i
( |N | −2)!
|N |! +
(|N | −1)!
|N |!
+/- = λi α˜i
where∑
S⊆N\i: |S |>1
|S|!( |N | − |S| −1)!
|N |! +
∑
j∈N\i
(|N | −2)!
|N |! +
( |N | −1)!
|N |! = 1.
Thus, we have the solution imposing that for any i ∈N , the Shapley
value becomes Shi (N ,vλ) = α˜i if we set λi = 1, ∀i ∈N . Moreover,
vλ corresponds to the total airtime fraction of LTE-U cells.
REMARK 3. The proof of Lemma 2 is intuitive. It imposes
that we need only to know the individual payoffs of players.
Thus, we can set ζ = 1, and the mechanism M involves only
the complexity of calculating the individual payoffs of players
given in equation (15).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
A feasible allocation of airtime fraction is max-min fair if for
each LTE-U cell i, αi cannot be increased without decreasing α j ,
where α j ≤ αi . Let us define the order mapping µ : R |N | → R |N |
as the mapping which sorts in non-decreasing order: µ(α1, . . ., α |N | ) =
(α(1), . . ., α( |N |) ) with α(1) ≤ α(2) . . . ≤ α( |N |) . Lexicographic or-
dering of vectors in V (N ) is defined by α lex> α′ if and only if
there exists an i such that α > α′ and for all j < i, α j = α′j . Also,
it is said that α
lex≥ α′ if and only if α lex> α′ or α = α′. Vector
α is leximin larger than or equal to α′ if µ(α)
lex≥ µ(α′). Thus,
α ∈ V (N ) is leximin maximal on set V (N ) if for all α′ ∈ V (N ),
we have µ(α)
lex≥ µ(α′). If a max-min fair vector exists on V (N ),
then it is the unique leximin maximal vector on V (N ). Due to
the zero-monotonicity, in every turn, each player is better off, i.e.
α˜i ≤ αi (S) ≤ αi (S′) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ S′,∀S′ ⊆ N where S ⊂ S′. That
is enough for ensuring the leximin maximal property of α. This
concludes the proof that the NTU Shapley value is max-min fair in
the proposed payoff configuration.
